Abstract. Technology has provided state and federal governments with huge collections of DNA samples and identifying profiles stored in databanks. That information can be used to solve crimes by matching samples from convicted felons to unsolved crimes, and has aided law enforcement in investigating and convicting suspects, and exonerating innocent felons, even after lengthy incarceration. Rights surrounding the provision of DNA samples, however, remain unclear in light of the constitutional guarantee against ''unreasonable searches and seizures'' and privacy concerns. The courts have just begun to consider this issue, and have provided little guidance. It is unclear whether the laws governing protected health information are applicable to the instant situation, and if so, the degree to which they apply. DNA databanks are not uniformly regulated, and it is possible that DNA samples contained in them may be used for purposes unintended by donors of the samples. As people live their lives, they leave bits of their DNA behind. They cannot be assured that these tiny specimens will not be taken or used against their will or without their knowledge for activities such as profiling to measure tendencies such as thrill-seeking, aggressiveness, or crimes with threatening behavior. Existing racial or ethnic discrimination and profiling may also encompass genetic discrimination and profiling, creating societal class distinctions. This article will explore the constitutionality of collecting genetic materials, the ethics of such activities, and balance the social good in solving crime and deterrence against the individual's security, liberty, and privacy.
Background
Technology has provided state and federal governments with huge collections of DNA samples and identifying profiles stored in databanks. That information can be used to solve crimes by matching samples from convicted felons to unsolved crimes. Genetic evidence from a crime scene is admissible at trial when a state's computerized DNA database matches the crime scene evidence with a DNA sample from a prison inmate included in the database. While the genetic pool of potential suspects in the nationwide DNA database, known as CODIS, or Combined DNA Index System, grows as more people are incarcerated, many states 1 are increasing the number of crimes for which a prisoner is mandated to provide a DNA sample. That requirement has aided law enforcement in investigating and ultimately convicting suspects. The samples also may result in exonerating possible suspects as well as proving the innocence of convicted felons, many of whom are on death row, after lengthy incarceration. 2 In that regard, the AMA in 2000 adopted a policy supporting the criminal justice system's use of all appropriate medical forensic techniques to avoid wrongful convictions or executions. 2 The states with the most DNA exonerations -Illinois (14) and New York (7) -are also the only states with statutes authorizing postconviction DNA testing for inmates. Both states allow testing at any time if there is a reasonable probability the tests will exonerate the inmate. These states also pay for DNA testing if the inmate cannot afford to do so. J. Dwyer, P. Neufeld, B. Scheck, Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution and Other Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted. New York: Doubleday, 2000, p. 262. 3 A total of 137 people have been released as a result of DNA analysis since 1989. Still, only 29 states currently allow convicted prisoners access to DNA testing. See note 15, infra, and the Innocence Project data, available at http:// innocentproject.org.
This article will explore
• the constitutionality of collecting genetic materials in light of Fourth Amendment prohibitions against ''unreasonable searches and seizures''; • the ethics of such activities;
• privacy concerns and individual rights; and • the need to balance the benefits of genetic information to society against the rights of individuals to control and safeguard information about themselves and prevent its use for unintended purposes.
If a suspect is in custody, the suspect's constitutional right to refuse to provide a genetic sample may be at issue. Commentators have cited suspects' Fifth Amendment right not to act as a ''witness against themselves'' as the basis for refusal. Courts, however, have limited the right against self-incrimination to a suspect's oral testimony. 4 The Fourth Amendment right against ''unreasonable searches and seizures '' 5 requires the issuance of a warrant and the presence of probable cause before any search may be conducted. The law in this area has been settled and well-established with regard to searches of houses and personal effects.
6 Rights relating to obtaining a DNA sample, however, remain unclear.
7 It can be argued that the sensitive nature of some of the information within our DNA means that even noninvasive DNA sampling should be treated as a search subject to Fourth Amendment analysis.
8 Inclusion in the DNA database is a form of discovery and does not condemn or sanction anyone. The fear has been expressed that if people are included in the database, they have a greater chance of being erroneously accused of a crime. The risk of false accusations from database searches is a reason to have strict quality control and assurance measures, and to educate police and the public that a ''hit'' is not the end of the investigation. While the basic structure of DNA is the same for everyone, no two individuals, other than identical twins (or cloned individuals), have the same DNA sequence. This discovery has had important repercussions in the criminal justice system, where DNA can serve as an identification tool. 10 As such, DNA can be valuable in proving or disproving suspects' physical involvement in criminal activity 11 and for other purposes such as identifying deceased victims. For this reason, DNA identification is often referred to as ''DNA fingerprinting'' and is compared to tra-4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) . Other issues such as the propriety of ''DNA dragnets'' in which large numbers of individuals in a geographic area are asked to provide samples voluntarily, the validity of court orders for samples based on a lesser standard than probably cause, or a movement to create a DNA exception to the statute of limitations in cases in which DNA evidence permits the identification of the perpetrator after the expiration of the normal period of limitations are issues beyond the scope of this article. See E.J. Imwinkelried and D.H. Kaye, ''DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues,'' 76 Washington Law Review (4) 413-474 (2001) for in-depth treatment of these issues. 5 It should be noted that all searches and seizures are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment; only those characterized as ''unreasonable'' are disallowed. 6 The Supreme Court has even addressed use of dogs to detect the odor of narcotics, holding that that activity does not constitute a search ''because it does not require physical intrusion of the object being sniffed and it does not expose anything other than the contraband items.'' United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 706-707 (1983) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
7 As the Supreme Court observed in Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 767-768 (1966) , referring to blood samples taken from a driver being treated in a hospital for injuries sustained in an automobile accident, ''in dealing with intrusions into the human body rather than with state interferences with property relationships or private papers -'houses, papers, and effects' -we write on a clean slate.'' That statement holds true as well when dealing with DNA samples. It is interesting to note that the extraction, analysis, and storage of DNA from prison inmates convicted of a sex offense constituted a reasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment in a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 101 F.3d (10th Cir. 1996 , reh'g denied. The Tenth Circuit based its finding on an inmate's diminished privacy rights, the minimal invasion of blood tests, and ''the legitimate government interest in the investigation and prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use of DNA in a manner not significantly different from the use of fingerprints.'' Id. at 1340. 15 nevertheless there is growing resistance on the part of prosecutors to allow the postconviction DNA testing. Calling attention to the 137 post-conviction DNA exonerations, Sessions argues that it is the moral responsibility of prosecutors to permit testing to go forward in cases where the results can make a difference. Opponents of post-conviction DNA testing fear that it would unleash demands from every inmate at exorbitant cost. The Innocence Project at Yeshiva University's Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, a nonprofit legal clinic, rigorously screens requests and eliminates about 90%; costs are often borne by the defendants, the Innocence Project network, and other nonprofit organizations.
As databanks have expanded into larger populations, policies governing the disposition on DNA samples have not been clarified. While federal laws are attempting to regulate disclosures of genetic information to unauthorized parties like employers or insurers, and certain states have enacted laws containing sanctions to ensure that sensitive information is not misused or wrongly obtained, uniformity among states does not exist. This ad hoc approach has led to results that may vary from one clinician to another, one laboratory to another, one employer to another, one insurer to another and one legislature to another. 16 The question arises about why this should concern anyone. Kimmelman summarizes the ethical argument succinctly as follows:
The claim is frequently made, for example, that ''only the guilty have something to fear.'' Although the negative perceptions of police forces by many members of racial minorities undermine the force of this argument, one needn't invoke nefarious motives of police forces to find such broad-based databanking socially questionable. Storing information on otherwise unsuspected individuals that would be primarily used for criminal investigations in effect expresses an ethos of suspicion. Although such defensive policing might deter some crimes and solve others, it nevertheless creates a chilling dynamic between the government and its citizens, and undermines the long-standing legal tradition in the US of presumption of innocence.
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DNA as property
We all leave bits of DNA behind as we move through our day. An abandoned coffee cup, saliva expectorated on the sidewalk, dandruff, a used drinking straw, a cigarette butt, the shirt we send to the laundry, or an envelope we have licked, all contain samples of our DNA and have implicated individuals in criminal activity. It has been suggested that these bits of DNA have actually been abandoned 18 17 See note 13, supra. 18 Abandonment occurs when there is ''a giving up, a total desertion, and absolute relinquishment of private goods by a former owner.'' R.A. Brown, The Law of Property 8 (W.B. Raushenbush, ed., 3rd ed. 1975) cited in source, this note, infra. There are two categories of abandonment: (1) specific intent of desertion, such as throwing property away or leaving property behind. This applies to objects of value or without value, such as those left in a dumpster, or purposefully left behind in a hotel room. (2) Intent is determined by a failure by the owner to retrieve or reclaim property after a casual or unintentional loss. In this instance, property is abandoned if the owner knows where it is and does not go after it. Id., citing Schley v. Couch, 284 S. W.2d 333 (Tex. 1955) . See also P. Finkelman, ''Fugitive Baseballs and Abandoned Property: Who Owns the Home Run Ball? '' 23 Cardozo Law Rev. 1609 -1633 . If in fact we own our DNA, it would constitute property that could fit the first definition.
BEWARE! UNCLE SAM HAS YOU R D NA
EWARE! UN CLE SAM HAS YOUR DNA therefore, are not properly the subject of a ''search'' or an intrusion into one's genome, or alternatively, that there was implied consent 19 to utilize these samples. The threshold question becomes, therefore, whether an individual can actually own her body. Is our body properly our property? How do our legal rights with respect to our bodies compare to typical property rights, characterized as a ''bundle of rights''? 20 The law recognizes people's bodies as nearly inviolate. So long as a person has not been arrested, there are few justifications for doing something to a person's body against his will, or compelling him to submit to bodily invasions. 21 We have the right to exclude others from using or possessing our bodies, generally characterized as rights of personal privacy and autonomy. The right to transfer is one of the important claims included in the bundle; the question emerges, therefore, whether we can transfer ourselves by gift or sale. We cannot, of course, sell ourselves into slavery, nor sell our offspring. We can, however, sell our intellectual and physical prowess.
Most of the pressing policy questions deal with whether, or under what conditions, scientists, physicians, and biotechnology companies have rights to possess, use, or sell human bodily materials. If individuals actually abandon their bodily materials when the materials are removed from their body or discarded, there is a strong argument that bodily materials should be considered the property of the person from whom they were derived. Owning one's body then means owning all the constituent parts while they are still connected. Conversely, if a person's rights in her body are not akin to property rights, however, the contention could be raised that one's cells, when taken from one's body, are akin to unclaimed resources owned by no one and available for the taking. 22 It follows, therefore, that if an individual owns her body and its parts, she owns the entire bundle of rights and can control her own destiny. If this bundle of rights is categorized as property or something analogous to property, the legal and constitutional ramifications are many. Due process rights would attach, so that the government may not deprive an individual of property without due process of law and may not take property without just compensation. Estate laws would also apply and the bodily materials could then be transferred by will or by intestate succession. The bodily materials could also be subject to marital property laws and divided at divorce like other marital property. If she does not own her body and its parts, however, anyone can lay claim to the discarded cells/tissues/organs without claims of ''unreasonable search and seizure'' and other constitutional considerations.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Constitution were to permit a state to incorporate the profile of a sample into the database without express consent, it is appropriate to ask whether police should do so. The person who was never suspected of wrongdoing and who is fulfilling what s/he perceives as her civic duty to cooperate with the authorities may find herself enmeshed in unrelated investigations. In that case, obtaining informed consent may be desirable. That is, the police may need to explain in definite terms their intent to use the sample in future investigations. 23 It is likely that unless a suspect is explicit about the limited scope of her consent, police may and probably will use the sample in more than one investigation. In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 24 however, the Supreme Court held that where state medical personnel induce a patient to provide a bodily sample for the intended but unexpressed purpose of enforcing the criminal law, the ''waiver of known rights standard'' replaces the normal voluntariness standard because ''the reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.'' A written consent form could be another solution. 25 The issue of informed consent regarding the possible use of the samples presents a challenge in this instance, however, because of a general lack of 19 If there is express or implied consent, a search warrant is not required. It can be argued that by abandoning bits of our DNA, we have impliedly consented to its search and subsequent seizure. Taking this analogy one step further, however, it is questionable whether this consent is valid because of the likelihood that the person who is impliedly consenting is unaware of the consequences of the consent. 20 The ''bundle of rights'' attached to property are: ownership, possession, use, and control. 22 Ideas in the foregoing two paragraphs were suggested by the Ossorio article, note 21, supra.
23 But see note 57, infra, and the accompanying discussion and recommendation.
24 532 U.S. 67 (2001) . 25 It should be pointed out, however, that the average citizen who is approached by authorities assumes that she does not have the option to refuse to consent, and if she does so, she will be considered a suspect in the matter under investigation. This ''coercion'' could weaken or vitiate the validity and voluntary nature of the consent. awareness and understanding of potential genetic information gathering and testing.
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What is more alarming, moreover, is the fact that Americans cannot be assured that their DNA will not be taken or used against their will or without their knowledge for purposes of activities such as profiling to measure tendencies such as thrill-seeking, aggressiveness, or crimes with threatening behavior 27 . DNA could be linked to manic depression or other tendencies inherent in crimes yet to be committed to identify potential perpetrators.
28 Genes may also create class distinctions in society, 29 28 The prediction of ''dangerousness'' has been problematic in every jurisdiction, and genetic testing might make it more reliable. Id. In contrast, in 1995 JAMA and four medical specialty societies and the American Society for Human Genetics called for a moratorium on genetic testing for Alzheimer's disease despite the fact that isolation of the suspected gene had become routine in half of all cases. The social stigma attached to one known or believed to suffer from Alzheimer's disease was believed to outweigh the possibly misleading research testing necessary to document the disease. (December 19, 2000) , requires a DNA sample to be collected from persons convicted of certain federal offenses who are serving time in prison, or on probation, or supervised release. See 42 U.S.C. sections 14135a(a)(1),(2). Failure to comply with the Act is a misdemeanor. Id. at section 14135a(a)(5).
33 See note 10, supra. Using crime scene samples to infer racial or ethnic characteristics is emerging as a distinct possibility. Imwinkelried and Kaye, note 4, supra, p. 413. 34 Scientists have determined that there is no single ''gay gene'' despite a great deal of hype to the contrary. Dean Hamer and Peter Copeland, Living with Our Genes: Why They Matter More Than You Think. New York: Doubleday, 1998. and intelligence, 35 which are believed to have a genetic basis. Genes also strongly influence alcoholism and alcohol consumption. 36 While specific genetic factors continue to be associated with alcoholism and other addictive behaviors, their exact contributions and how this information could be used in mitigating the behaviors, remains unclear. 37 Smoking, generally considered a ''habit'' unrelated to genes, is being studied with regard to genes linked to novelty seeking (dopamine) and harm avoidance (serotonin).
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Law and policy
The United States has no coherent policy against which to judge whether, when, or how genetic testing should be encouraged, facilitated, discouraged, or prohibited.
39 Advances in technology have allowed forensic scientists to broaden the use of DNA analysis 40 so that they can now look at samples from old, unsolved cases that previously could not be tested.
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The National Institute of Justice estimates that there are 200,000-300,000 samples that have been collected from convicted criminals but not tested. The Bush administration has proposed budget allocations for fiscal year 2004, which begins October 1, 2003.
42 If the new budget is approved by Congress, these would be the first expenditures in a five-year $1 billion program to increase and improve the use of DNA technology in the criminal justice system. They include:
• $92.9 million to shrink the backlog of untested DNA samples in rape, homicide and kidnapping cases and samples taken from convicted criminals. Continued funding would eventually eliminate state and federal DNA analysis backlogs, especially for cases of sexual assault and murder.
• $90.4 million for improvements that would enable federal, state and local crime labs to process DNA evidence more rapidly and efficiently.
• $24.8 million for research and development of better ways to analyze DNA samples, including the creation of a National Forensic Science Commission that would study and make recommendations concerning the use of DNA technology and forensic science in criminal justice.
• $17.5 million for training for police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and other law enforcement officials who collect and use DNA evidence. The training would focus on proper collection and application of DNA evidence to solving crime. • $5 million to help states cover costs of post-conviction DNA testing for inmates who claim they were wrongly convicted in cases where testing was unavailable or used on crime-scene evidence. States receiving this funding will be required to develop plans ensuring prompt testing in cases of wrongful conviction. The plans must also be designed to discourage frivolous demands for DNA testing.
• $2 million for education and training that will enable law enforcement officers to identify human remains. Justice officials cited the ''tremendous emotional turmoil'' suffered by families whose missing loved ones may be dead but whose re- 35 Single genes that cause mental retardation will prevent a person from reaching normal levels of intelligence, but it is unclear whether the same genes also influence the normal ranges of intelligence. Id. at 228-231. Speaking of fragile X syndrome, the most common form of inherited mental retardation, ''the fragile X gene is working on a whole system of which the brain is a part. These genes are not acting on intelligence per se, but normal intelligence is impossible unless the genes work properly.'' Id. at 231.
36 Sophia Koliopoulos, ''DNA and Behavior: Is Our Fate in Our Genes?'' October 2001 http://www.dnafiles.org/ about/pgm2/topic.html.
38 See note 34, supra, at 153-155. 39 The narrow scope of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) limits genetic predisposition as a basis for denying medical insurance policies and bars genetic discrimination in federal employment. On October 14, 2003, the Senate passed The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (S.1053) banning the use of genetic information by insurance companies or employers to restrict coverage or to make hiring decisions. Under the Senate bill, insurers could not collect genetic information prior to enrolling a person in a group health plan, nor use that information to deny coverage or set premium rates. After enrollment, HIPAA's privacy rules govern how the insurance company can get information and when authorization is required. S.1053 goes beyond current law and HIPAA. See K.E. Hanna, ''Senate Passes Genetic Nondiscrimination Bill,'' The Hastings Center Report 33(6): 8 (November-December 2003) . 40 The United States does not have laws in place to protect against unauthorized use of DNA samples. The DNA Identification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. sections 14131-14133 is limited to forensic testing for law enforcement. 41 DNA samples can be held indefinitely, so there is the added threat that the samples will be used for purposes other than those for which they were gathered. 42 At the time of this writing, the 2004 budget is at an impasse. Spending is continuing at 2003 levels. mains were not immediately identified, such as the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
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Two major landmark Supreme Court cases predominate this area: Katz v. United States 44 and California v. Greenwood 45 . Decided in 1967, Katz involved the operation of a suspected multistate gambling ring by phone. Federal agents placed a ''bug'' on the outside of a phone booth used by Charles Katz and introduced the recordings as evidence to convict him for ''illegal transmission of wagering information.'' The conviction was upheld on appeal, the appellate court noting that agents did not physically enter the phone booth. In seeking to have the conviction overturned, Katz raised two issues: (1) whether a public phone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that data obtained by attaching an electronic listening device on top of the booth is procured in violation of the right of privacy of the user; and (2) whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can be said to violate the Fourth Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, decided the case on a broader question than those enunciated above. Instead, the Court decided that it was not the existence of an enclosed place that created a right of privacy, but someone engaging in an activity that s/he can reasonably expect to be private. 46 The Court concluded that Katz's rights under the Fourth Amendment had been violated and overturned the conviction because the agents had failed to obtain a warrant. Since Katz, the concept of ''a reasonable expectation of privacy'' has entered the public parlance and has become a threshold question that is applied to other privacy questions. 47 The second case that impacts this study is that of California v. Greenwood. Decided in 1988, the case involved information indicating that Greenwood might be engaged in narcotics trafficking. On the basis of items indicative of narcotics use found in garbage bags left on the curb in front of his house, the police obtained search warrants to search the house and discovered controlled substances during the searches. Finding that probable cause to search the house would not have existed without the evidence obtained from the trash searches, the California Superior Court dismissed the charges, holding that warrantless trash searches violated the Fourth Amendment. The California Court of Appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilege 48 of a home. It further stated that any claimed expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items discarded was not reasonable. Once the items were discarded, any constitutional right to privacy in those items has been abandoned. It is not necessary for the trash to be hauled to the garbage dump and be intermingled with the trash of others because, as the Court indicated, ''it is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.'' Society commonly recognizes that garbage left for collection at the side of a public street is not entitled to protection from government invasion. Similarly, the Court added, ''A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.'' Obviously, a person intent on preserving the secrecy or security of her papers and/or effects can shred them or dispose of them in other ways that would thwart police surveillance. These options, of course, were ignored. In S. 347 (1967) . 45 486 U.S. 35 (1988) . 46 The Court stated, ''No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies [the booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication. ' 445 (1989) it is permissible for a police helicopter to look through a hole in a roof to search for marijuana plants. 48 Curtilege may or may not be a fence. It depends on (a) its proximity to house, (b) whether the area is within an enclosure surrounding the home, (c) the uses to which the area is put, and (d) any steps taken to protect the area from observation. A trash can placed on the curb is not protected, but if the same trash can is placed on a porch, a warrant must be obtained before its contents can be searched. Abandoned effects, wastepaper baskets, and public places, including bathroom stalls, are not protected under the ''open fields doctrine.'' contrast, leaving a trail of DNA as a product of our daily routine is not a conscious activity and cannot be avoided. It is unlikely, therefore, that the same analysis should prevail in both scenarios.
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Conclusion
Most DNA databanks serve important and socially beneficial purposes. In the criminal justice sphere, state forensic DNA databanks are helping police apprehend violent repeat offenders who might never have been captured. In the military, stored DNA samples help to identify remains of those killed in action. DNA banking aids individuals and families in making important decisions about their health. At the same time, however, DNA data banking is raising complex questions of law, ethics, and public policy.
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The Medical Information Bureau (MIB), medical databank for the insurance industry, stores coded information on some 13 million Americans, including two codes for what it terms ''family hereditary history.'' Insisting that its codes are not genetic codes and that it has no interest in genetic information, nevertheless the capability and expertise exist for MIB to cross-reference individual and family genetic data.
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The public policy interests to be served by new legislation or policy initiatives must include efforts to protect the privacy and confidentiality of genetic information by preventing at-risk individuals who wish to undergo genetic testing from being dissuaded out of fear that the information generated will be used to their detriment; conserving medical resources by preventing professionals and medical technology from being used for inappropriate nonmedical purposes, or limiting use in nonclinical settings; preventing discrimination by insurers and/or employers based on genetic information, 52 and preventing the disqualification of persons from certain activities based on fear of future illness. 53 Moreover, there must be a universal education of both laypeople and professionals aimed at a general understanding of the fact that genetic ''predisposition'' does not necessarily mean ''disease'' and ''disease'' does not necessarily mean ''incapacity.'' Additionally, it should be recognized that a gene does not make people do things. It does not dictate emotions or thoughts. Instead, a gene may trigger biochemical events in the body, interact with environmental and developmental influences, and increase the likelihood that a particular action will result.
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The continuous process of balancing the right of privacy against the goal of law enforcement and crime reduction illustrates the absence of an absolute and concrete answer to the privacy issue. 55 Explosive growth of computer databases has increased the threat to privacy by creating large amounts of information about the details of people's lives and health while providing little control over how that information may be used. 56 Requiring that the genetic sample be destroyed or returned after the 49 See note 10, supra; Imwinkelried and Kaye, note 4, supra.
50 Forensic DNA data banks are subject to state and federal regulation to some degree; the military's DNA repository is subject only to the internal Department of Defense control, and the research and clinical service banks housed in academic and commercial laboratories remain unregulated. J.E. McEwen, ''DNA Data Banks' ' (pp. 231-251) 55 The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 552a, enacted December 31, 1974, became part of the Freedom of Information Act of 1966. Reflecting the need to balance individual privacy concerns with the institutional practice of storing information, the Act does not prevent the government from gathering information about people and thereby invading their privacy. Instead it allows a citizen to learn what the government knows about his or her private life. While the Privacy Act applies only to the federal government, most states have similar legislation. Protection at the state level, however, lack uniformity and are generally inconsistent. HIPAA protects only health information stored electronically.
56 See note 10, supra. Another danger and risk derived from the absence of controls, although unethical, is that someone could actually seize another's DNA and place it at the scene of a crime. ''Justice Talking presents DNA Databanks'', recorded June 10, 2002, available at http://justicetalking.org.
analysis necessary for identification is performed will afford protection against inappropriate uses and may represent a useful remedy. 57
